

# **Rethinking Cultural Influences on Warfare**

**A Monograph  
by  
Major Scott W. Horrigan  
Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**AY 2012-001**

|  |  |   |   |                                  |
|--|--|---|---|----------------------------------|
| <b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>   |  |   | Form Approved<br>OMB No. 074-0188   |                                  |
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503  |  |   |   |                                  |
| <b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>  |  | <b>2. REPORT DATE</b><br>15-05-2012                   | <b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b><br>SAMS Monograph, July 2011-May 2012 |                                  |
| <b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b><br>RETHINKING CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON WARFARE  |  |   | <b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>   |                                  |
| <b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b><br>Major Scott W. Horrigan, U.S. Army  |  |   |   |                                  |
| <b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b><br>School of Advanced Military Studies<br>(SAMS)<br>250 Gibbon Avenue<br>Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134   |  |   | <b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>                               |                                  |
| <b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b><br>U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies<br>Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350   |  |   | <b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b><br>CGSC               |                                  |
| <b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>   |  |   |   |                                  |
| <b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b><br>Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited   |  |   |   | <b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>    |
| <b>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)</b><br><p>This monograph presents a method for military planners to operationalize an adversary's culture during conceptual planning. To present this methodology, the monograph asks the question, is a Western way of war distinctly different from a non-Western way of war. Victor Davis Hanson's description of a Western way of war is examined to develop an ordinal scaling methodology that allows cultural variables to be operationalized by a planning team prior to the onset of war.</p> <p>The four variables used by Hanson to describe a distinctive way of war are discipline, infantry, technology, and individualism. Through examination of participants in the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean War, and the Sino-Vietnam War, ordinal scaling reveals there is a distinctive Western way of war, but highlights the nuances of cultural influences on warfare. At best, Western and non-Western warfare are only rough categories with vague boundaries, not clear dichotomies. Western warfare may be distinctive, but a state's approach to warfare can adopt characteristics from both Western and non-Western warfare, creating nuances not recognized by Hanson.</p> |  |   |   |                                  |
| <b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b><br>Western warfare, ordinal scaling, Culture, Non-Western warfare   |  |   |   | <b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b><br>52 |
|  |  |   |   | <b>16. PRICE CODE</b>            |
| <b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b><br>(U)  | <b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b><br>(U) | <b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b><br>(U) | <b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>   |                                  |

# **SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES**

## **MONOGRAPH APPROVAL**

Major Scott W. Horrigan

Title of Monograph: Rethinking Cultural Influences on Warfare

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Michael D. Mihalka Ph.D. Monograph Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Thomas C. Graves, COL, IN Director,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Director,  
Graduate Degree  
Programs

Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

## **Abstract**

RETHINKING CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON WARFARE by MAJOR Scott W. Horrigan, ARMY, 51 pages.

This monograph presents a method for military planners to operationalize an adversary's culture during conceptual planning. To present this methodology, the monograph asks the question, is a Western way of war distinctly different from a non-Western way of war. Victor Davis Hanson's description of a Western way of war is examined to develop an ordinal scaling methodology that allows cultural variables to be operationalized by a planning team prior to the onset of war.

The four variables used by Hanson to describe a distinctive way of war are discipline, infantry, technology, and individualism. Through examination of participants in the Russo-Japanese War, the Korean War, and the Sino-Vietnam War, ordinal scaling reveals there is a distinctive Western way of war, but highlights the nuances of cultural influences on warfare. At best, Western and non-Western warfare are only rough categories with vague boundaries, not clear dichotomies. Western warfare may be distinctive, but a state's approach to warfare can adopt characteristics from both Western and non-Western warfare, creating nuances not recognized by Hanson.

## Table of Contents

|   |    |
|---|----|
| MONOGRAPH APPROVAL .....                | i  |
| Abstract .....                          | ii |
| Introduction .....                      | 1  |
| Literature Review .....                 | 5  |
| Cultural Realism.....                   | 5  |
| Cultural Determinism .....              | 11 |
| Methodology .....                       | 22 |
| The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)..... | 31 |
| Historical Setting .....                | 31 |
| Analysis of Participants.....           | 32 |
| The Korean War (1950-1953) .....        | 35 |
| Historical Setting .....                | 35 |
| Analysis of Participants.....           | 36 |
| The Sino-Vietnam War (1979).....        | 41 |
| Historical Setting .....                | 41 |
| Analysis of Participants.....           | 42 |
| Conclusion.....                         | 46 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY .....                      | 48 |

*Just as German soil constituted the military front line of the Cold War, the waters of the South China Sea may constitute the military front line of the coming decades.<sup>1</sup>*

*He who knows the enemy and himself will never in a hundred battles be at risk; He who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win and sometimes lose; He who knows neither the enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle.<sup>2</sup>*

## Introduction

In the decades to come the states of Asia will begin to look outward to expand and consolidate control based on perceived national interests.<sup>3</sup> With 615 million people in South East Asia, over 1.3 billion in China, and 1.5 billion in India, this region of the world cannot be subjected to simplification as a homogeneous culture, but must be recognized for its nuances. Recent changes to the national security strategy and the re-focusing of U.S. national power in the Pacific region make this part of the world critical for military planners to understand.<sup>4</sup> Some popular academic contributions have constructed a conception of a non-Western way of war that is something distinct from Western warfare. The construction of two distinct ways of war from cultural interpretations has a potential negative impact for military planners if they fail to conceptualize how culture can be applied to better understand an adversary's approach to war. It is not a question of whether culture should matter to military planners, but how it matters, and most importantly how to conceptualize it.

Events during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, such as, the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet War, the continuing Taiwan Strait crisis, and the impressive rise of China have increased the quantity of scholarship conducted to understand this region's trajectory as military powers.

---

<sup>1</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict," *Foreign Policy* (September 2011): 82.

<sup>2</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballentine Books, 1993), 113.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 80.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2011), 1-3.

The fascination with comparing Western versus non-Western approaches to war has sparked academic studies about the potential of culture to explain the conduct of war.<sup>5</sup> Many efforts of the past to develop universal truths of how wars are won or lost have failed to appreciate the significance of culture and a growing opinion from theorists, academics, and practitioners argue that we should turn back to culture “as a code for understanding warfare.”<sup>6</sup> Authors such as Victor Davis Hanson, John Keegan, Patrick Porter, and John Lynn have suggested that by adopting a cultural approach to the study of war, we are better suited to appreciate the variety and change in the practice of war. Keegan argues that war is not a “universal phenomenon, practiced at all times and all places” and that “war embraces much more than politics: that it is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms.”<sup>7</sup>

This monograph asks the question, is a Western operational approach to war distinctly different from non-Western approaches as posited by Victor Davis Hanson? Hanson published the book *Carnage and Culture* in which among other arguments he advocates the distinctiveness of Western approach to war. To Hanson, Western warfare embodies a unique kind of civic militarism, a pattern emerging out of democracy and free market capitalism, which has rendered the West unbeatable in its conflicts with the rest of the world. “The peculiar way Greeks killed,” he argues, “grew out of consensual government, equality among the middling classes, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism, and rationalism.”<sup>8</sup> He emphasized the presence of Western cultural characteristics, which evolved from civic militarism, warfare by willing citizens, and implies the absence of these same characteristics in non-Western warfare.

---

<sup>5</sup> John Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), xv.

<sup>6</sup> Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture* (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 10 and Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 6.

<sup>7</sup> John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 48 and 12.

<sup>8</sup> Hanson, 4.

This monograph examines Hanson's independent variables of the supremacy of landed infantry, the singularity of technology, superiority of Western discipline, and the individualism within military forces to determine if Western warfare is distinctly different from non-Western warfare as Hanson posits. If Western and non-Western warfare are distinctive then we should presume that they are significantly different along the characteristics of culture that Hanson articulates.

Since the publication of *Carnage and Culture*, historians have continued to pick apart the historical details of Hanson's book and criticize his selective use of history. Any attempt at a broad argument such as Hanson's that seeks a single explanation for Western military dominance is bound to be critiqued, but this monograph is not interested in Hanson's interpretation of historical events such as whether Alexander was a brutal monarch or the head of a democratic polity. Nor does it examine why Rome is regarded as more Western than Carthage, although each demonstrated a capitalist tradition, which Hanson identifies as crucial to military success.<sup>9</sup> In addition this monograph is not interested in examining Hanson's spurious causal explanations such as his assertion that Greek sailors at Salamis were more capable because of their notion of free speech or that there exists an unbroken and direct line of continuity between classical Greece and modern Western warfare.<sup>10</sup> Instead, Hanson's conclusions deserve a more systematic critique in how they create a dichotomy between Western and non-Western approaches to war. "This dichotomy is true enough of all East-West engagements in the history of warfare."<sup>11</sup> An unchallenged reading of Hanson potentially provides military planners with an unintentional framework to operationalize how culture influences approaches to war. Military planners need to

---

<sup>9</sup> Robert M. Citino, "Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction," *American Historical Review* (October 2007), 1085-1086.

<sup>10</sup> Hanson, 51. See also Lynn's critical analysis of continuity between Greek warfare and imperial Rome, 15-19.

<sup>11</sup> Hanson, 348.



be armed with a framework that conceptualizes culture, which does not merely suggest the absence or presence of cultural characteristics or attempts to distinguish between mutually exclusive categories without respect to the relative importance of those categories. Instead, a conceptual framework that provides more detailed and precise information with respect to the variable being measured and how it relates to other cases could provide military planners with an ability to anticipate how culture influences warfare.

Although aspects of Hanson's argument is attractive from the perspective that it highlights the importance of culture in war, Hanson's analysis provides misleading conclusions for military planners seeking to understand how culture influences warfare. At best, Western and non-Western warfare are only rough categories with vague boundaries, not clear dichotomies. Western warfare may be distinctive, but a state's approach to warfare can adopt characteristics from both Western and non-Western warfare, creating nuances not recognized by Hanson. Warfare and military culture is more varied than Hanson suggests and the commonalities between Western and non-Western warfare dismiss any assertion of the inherent mutual exclusivity of these forms of warfare. This monograph will first demonstrate that as military planners attempt to operationalize culture, a more nuanced approach is required than Hanson suggests. Secondly, this monograph will provide military planners a method to operationalize culture in order to anticipate an adversary or allies approach to warfare.

The structure of this paper first provides a literature review on the cultural analysis of war from notable scholars and highlights the methodological challenges inherent in the cultural study of war. Second, this paper reviews Hanson's argument in order to build a valid and practical methodology for military planners to conceptualize culture and its influence on warfare. This methodology section provides a way of operationalizing culture through ordinal measurements, which can offer the military planner an alternative to Hanson's methodology of nominal measurements. Finally, this monograph examines three historical case studies to test if Western

warfare is distinctive from non-Western warfare and to demonstrate the value of ordinal measurements in operationalizing culture.

## **Literature Review**

Cultural approaches to understanding war vary in degree, but tend to accept that culture at some level profoundly shapes choices and that people act and think based on the influences of culture. “In the language of security studies, cultural theories claim that ideational factors (i.e. ideas and norms) explain things better than realism, the approach that stresses objective interests and material balances of power.”<sup>12</sup> Despite the potential value of a cultural analysis of war, it is not without its challenges, which have become evident, as scholars have demonstrated, and this literature review will highlight below. In order to examine Hanson’s argument previous scholarship needs to be reviewed to better illustrate the challenges and benefits of applying culture to understand different societies operational approaches to war. This section now turns its attention to specific ways culture has been examined by scholars such as Porter, Lynn, and Keegan attempting to conduct a cultural interpretation of war.

## **Cultural Realism**

Patrick Porter advocates a school of thought often referred to as cultural realism, which recognizes that culture is flexible and changing. This basic assumption creates a useful lens for viewing “others” than schools that see culture as acting upon and imposing a fixed set of traditions on its inert subjects.<sup>13</sup> According to Porter, culture is better approached not as a clear script for action, but as an ambiguous repertoire of ideas through which societies make strategy and this lack of cultural determinacy helps to explain why war is so full of surprises. Porter seeks

---

<sup>12</sup>Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 12.

<sup>13</sup> Dave Clemente, “Book Reviews,” *International Affairs* 87/6 (November 2011): 1520.

to show that the broad categories of Western and non-Western warfare have been socially constructed with values and traditions that make them as opposite as they are fictitious.<sup>14</sup> Porter does not dismiss the importance and in fact applauds the U.S. militaries turn toward understanding culture as an important corrective action to naive ethnocentrism, but warns about the dangers of oversimplification.

The turn towards culture to explain war has grown out of the U.S. strategic crisis and its cognitive failure to understand foreign societies in Asia and the Middle East.<sup>15</sup> The U.S. strategic failure against Al Qaeda according to Porter is a result of conceptual confusion, “It is a war formulated on supersized, global principles at the expense of local knowledge.”<sup>16</sup> This crisis motivated scholars, soldiers, and political leaders to embrace culture in order to follow the advice of Sun Tzu to know your enemy and know yourself. For instance, Beatrice Heuser claims that the French failure in Indo-China and Algeria was a “lack of emphasis on and sympathy for cultural differences” and that culture “is the key variable in group relations.”<sup>17</sup> Other scholars like Tony Corn blame the errors of the Iraq war on the American emphasis on Clausewitz, arguing that classical strategy should be replaced with anthropology. “This will shed light on the grammar and logic of tribal warfare, creating the conceptual weapons necessary to return fire.”<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Robert Johnson, “Book Review”, *Journal of Military History* 74/1 (January 2010): 213. p212-214

<sup>15</sup> Porter, 6.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>17</sup> Beatrice Heuser, “The Cultural Revolution in Counterinsurgency,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30 (February 2007): 155-169.

<sup>18</sup> Tony Corn, “Clausewitz in Wonderland”, Policy Review, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/by-author/10422> (accessed 12 December 2011). Additional references on the importance of an anthropological approach to strategy, see Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (Holmes and Meier, 1979); Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, *Warfare in the Third World* (Palgrave, 2001); more recently, Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (Yale University Press, 2006); Richard L. Taylor, *Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Strategy* (Carlisle Papers, 2005).

The embrace of culture as a domain to understanding the conduct of war is reflected in recent U.S. military doctrine and the focus of senior military leaders in operationalizing and integrating culture into the professional military education system. Within military education, culture is approached as a dimension of warfare that must be operationalized at all levels of war by integrating anthropological training into the education system.<sup>19</sup> The human dimension in war has always been a part of U.S. military doctrine but the publication of *Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24)* refocuses the military in order to operate in a world defined by the interaction between different cultures. As Porter points out, the word “culture” appears sixty-one times and the word “cultural” appears seventy-nine times in the 2006 *FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, which highlights the relevance of cultural awareness to military theory, doctrine, and operations. It states in its introduction that cultural knowledge is essential in a counterinsurgency campaign as the American social perspective of reality is not a universal outlook.<sup>20</sup> “It reflects the realization that satellites can yield information but people must interpret its meaning.”<sup>21</sup> Military doctrine consistently places an emphasis on culture in the design of operations to achieve the desired end state and requires the military to understand the culture and the problems faced by all actors in a conflict.<sup>22</sup>

Understanding culture provides insight into the thoughts and actions of allies and adversaries, but also provides the culturally literate observer the ability to anticipate an adversaries approach to warfare. It is through cultural literacy and the foundation it provides that warfare can be understood in its complexity. John Shy notes that a nation’s behavior toward the

---

<sup>19</sup> Thomas R. Mockaitis, “The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future,” *Strategic Studies Institute* (February 2007): 37-38. See also Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, “Learning About Counterinsurgency,” *Military Review* (March 2007): 5-11. Argues that anthropology must inform officer education.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2006* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 1-15.

<sup>21</sup> Porter, 7-8.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Army, 1-28.

rest of the world cannot be completely explained through the perspective of power and interests when its actions are detrimental to those factors.<sup>23</sup> Instead, behavior can be best understood in terms of cultural peculiarities. A cultural analysis of war attributes behavior to some characteristic of culture: the difference between a more traditional structural analysis of war and a cultural analysis is that one points to powerful interests within a society, while the other points to the society as a whole.<sup>24</sup>

The cultural study of history and more specifically war has continued to fuel studies and publications for some time now. Many authors have approached the study of culture through different methods and through their efforts provided a source for cultural literacy. Military leaders at every level have been given the opportunity to review and glean certain lessons and apply these lessons in their efforts in ongoing operations around the world, but no systematic methodology exists to operationalize culture in the examination of warfare. The current level of interaction between U.S. armed forces and different cultures requires at least a basic understanding of culture and how it is applied to the planning and execution of operations. “The ability to map out the labyrinth of power structures, networks, and confessional or ethnic perspectives in a foreign society is a vital activity along the spectrum from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency.”<sup>25</sup> Even in military doctrine, the understanding of culture is often paramount, “successful conduct of COIN (counterinsurgency) operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted.”<sup>26</sup> The design of operations requires cultural literacy in order to understand problems, anticipate actions, and achieve a desired end state. Culture is powerful but malleable and military planners must acknowledge that an adversary will adapt

---

<sup>23</sup> John Shy, “The American Military Experience: History and Learning,” *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 1 (Winter 1971): 205.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 206.

<sup>25</sup> Porter, 56.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Army, 1-22.

because it is a strategic and pragmatic actor. The relationship between culture and warfare is not static and inflexible but is dynamic and full of surprises for those who enter a conflict believing that culture determines an adversary's method of warfare. It is because of these dynamics that a systematic methodology to operationalize culture does not exist and instead military planners rely on broad generalizations that are simplified and of questionable value.

The turn toward gaining a cultural understanding overcomes the influence of ethnocentrism and the mirror imaging of our cultural values on to another culture with its own history. Scholars according to John Ferris present cultural theories to remind us that the stakes or “referent objects of war,” such as national interests, “war aims,” or “victory,” are not mere self-evident things but a combination of things and ideas about them.<sup>27</sup> Culture helps to explain China's staunch defense of contested border areas in locations such as Tibet, the South China Sea, and even Taiwan. China's large, diverse population with a history of sporadic, violent domestic rebellions presents a problem that is endemic to China. Porter points to Israel's lack of strategic depth, its “small but educated population and its collective memory of security crises, has been drawn to pre-emptive war, offensive operations, high technology and an absolute view of security.”<sup>28</sup> A culture has grown out of both China's and Israel's strategic situation, which has potential to explain their operational approaches to war, but culture, is not dogma. Porter's view on culture challenges the concept of a unique and consistent way of war, instead advocating the cultural specificity unique to any war's time and place. This work then places culture not as a deterministic variable, but instead as an influencer that requires the culturally literate observer to understand that culture is malleable and subject to change.<sup>29</sup> The weakness with Porter's contribution is twofold; first, he demonstrates his theory using only four cases, which exist on a

---

<sup>27</sup> John Robert Ferris, *Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 107.

<sup>28</sup> Porter, 56.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 170.

temporal range from Genghis Khan to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War. Secondly, he offers no method for operationalizing culture in the study of others, but instead only provides warnings about the limitations and challenges of using culture to understand a societies approach to warfare.

John Lynn offers an analysis of how culture influences warfare in his book *Battle*, arguing for the contextual reality of war and the development of a theory concerning the “interaction between the ideal and the real in warfare.”<sup>30</sup> Lynn attempts to “bury the universal soldier” by revealing that there is no globally consistent method of warfare because every soldier, army, and form of warfare is a reflection of the unique culture from which it is drawn.<sup>31</sup> Lynn directly attacks Hanson’s thesis of a continuous Western way of war by arguing that there is no consistent form of warfare, Western culture has changed and so has its methods of warfare.

By recognizing that conflict affects society, many different segments of that society generate the discourse on war, and “as a result, a culture has no single discourse on war. Rather, a number of discourses comprise the values, expectations, etc., of varied societal groups that harbor potentially very different, and at time opposing interests and points of view.”<sup>32</sup> According to Lynn, this prevents the development of a singular way of war such as the Western way of war posited by Hanson. The reality of war also differs from the discourse of war, which normally leads to an adjustment of ideas about war. At the extremes, cultural historians sometimes insist that reality is simply what is perceived, and thus culturally determined, but Lynn claims this belief goes too far and fails to recognize the modification and adjustments a society makes to how it conducts warfare.

---

<sup>30</sup> Lynn, 331.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., xiv.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 333.

The debate on the effectiveness of studying culture to explain war counters the belief in universal principles. For some scholars like Michael Handel, strategy has a logic and rational direction of war, which is universal.<sup>33</sup> The view of scholars like Handel are supported by Thucydides who made generalizations about human nature and the fundamental causes of war, but Robert Kaplan argues for a return to cultural specificity when examining history.<sup>34</sup> By integrating culture into their analysis, military planners are able to overcome ethnocentrism and imagine the perspectives of others, but the examination of culture has methodological challenges. What is needed, and what will be presented later in this monograph is a systematic method for integrating culture into the analysis of an adversary, which does not become victim to the challenges of methodology.

## **Cultural Determinism**

John Keegan engaged in a cross-cultural study in his book *A History of Warfare* (1993). Keegan's cultural approach to war opposed Clausewitz's dictum that war is politics by asserting that war "is always an expression of culture, often a determinant of cultural forms, in some societies the culture itself." Keegan bases much of his thesis on Victor Davis Hanson's book *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (1989) which is later expanded on in *Carnage and Culture* (2001). Keegan describes culture as a prime determinant of the nature of warfare and highlights "Oriental warmaking" as something "different and apart" from Western warfare.<sup>35</sup>

Keegan establishes his argument in a very similar way that Hanson does, identifying cultural traits that are either absent or present in warfare. Because of the similarities in the mode

---

<sup>33</sup> Michael Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Routledge, 1996), 3.

<sup>34</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, "A History for Our Time" *Atlantic Monthly* 299 (January 2007): 78-84.

<sup>35</sup> Keegan, 387.



of analysis between Keegan and Hanson it is beneficial to highlight the challenges that plague each work. Keegan identifies the traits of moral, intellectual, and technological as characterizing Western warfare and evasion, delay, and indirectness as non-Western cultural traits, which are distinctive from Western warfare. While Keegan is an early advocate of the study of culture to explain war, his analysis is flawed. Although Porter and Lynn differ in their analysis of culture, their commonalities offer a start point to examine Keegan's thesis that culture is a determinant of war.

One of the first challenges of examining culture is determining its definition. Precise definitions are paramount to any valid study. First, it allows us to tell others exactly what we have done to obtain our measures so that the work can be evaluated. Secondly, a precise definition allows one to operationalize variables and eliminate rival explanations that claim conclusions were drawn through flaws in the measurement process.<sup>36</sup>

Academic definitions of culture are as numerous and varied as the diverse societies they attempt to explain. One of the earliest definitions of culture describes it as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."<sup>37</sup> Geert Hofstede, a social psychologist, defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the member of one category of people from another."<sup>38</sup> There are literally dozens of academic definitions, but they are not entirely different. Common attributes do exist; additionally two other important concepts are consistent in most interpretations of culture and worth highlighting. First, culture is communal: members of a group will largely adopt and practice the values and beliefs resident in the culture

---

<sup>36</sup> Jarole B. Manheim, Richard C. Lars Willnat, and Craig Brians, *Empirical Political Analysis: Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods* (New York: Pearson Education Inc, 2008), 71.

<sup>37</sup> Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (New York: J.P. Putnam and Sons, 1920), 1.

<sup>38</sup> Geert Hofstede, *Communication Between Cultures* eds. L.A. Samovar and R.E. Porter. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984), 51.

of that group. While culture is communal, it is not uniformly consistent throughout an identified social group, thus an apparently homogenous group may not display a uniform behavior.<sup>39</sup>

Second, culture is a learned, rather than a genetically programmed behavior.<sup>40</sup> Individuals absorb specific cultural characteristics through association with their social group, “culture is not inborn, it is subject to change over extended periods of time-however, and the rate at which a society or groups culture changes is governed by a wide array of cultural factors and should not be construed as certain.”<sup>41</sup>

Neither Keegan nor Hanson attempt to define how they use the term culture and because of this failure they create conceptual confusion. Anthropologists and academics outside of the military have become increasingly uncomfortable with the term culture.<sup>42</sup> Culture itself is an abstract system of values, symbols, social structures, institutions, norms, and codes. A recent academic understanding of culture has evolved to accept a more dynamic nature and recognize interplay with the environment. This approach to culture recognizes that culture is not “logical, coherent, shared, uniform, and static” but is “a sphere of practical activity shot through by willful action, power relations, struggle, contradiction, and change.”<sup>43</sup> Porter for his part defines culture “as an ambiguous repertoire of competing ideas that can be selected, instrumentalized, and manipulated instead of a clear script for action.”<sup>44</sup> Because Keegan and Hanson do not define culture, the reader does not know if they accept that culture changes, if it can be shared, or how it

---

<sup>39</sup> Defense Science Board, *Understanding Human Dynamics* (Washington: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (March 2009), 69.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> W.H. Reinhart, *Taking Culture to the Next Level: Understanding and Using Culture at the Operational Level of War* (Newport: Naval War College, 2010), 12.

<sup>42</sup> Robert Brightman, “Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Relexification”, *Cultural Anthropology* 10 (September 1995), 510

<sup>43</sup> William H. Sewell Jr. *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* eds. Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 44.

<sup>44</sup> Porter, 15.

is learned by future generations. This failure to define culture, which is at the heart of each theory, creates challenges in conceptualizing their theory.

The second challenge to the study of culture is measurement. Measurements should be not only accurate, but also precise; measurements should contain as much information as possible about the attribute or behavior being measured. When observing the relationship between two variables, the more precise the measures, the more complete and informative the test.<sup>45</sup> Keegan and Hanson use a nominal level of measurement to assign a variable to a category. Nominal measurements provide the least information about a phenomenon. To be useful, nominal measurements must be based on sets of categories that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. This means it must not be possible to assign a single case to multiple categories and the categories must be set up to ensure that all cases can be assigned to some category. If we want to classify a “way of war” by use of a nominal measuring scheme, the categories Western and non-Western cannot be used successfully, because these categories are not mutually exclusive. Even in a seemingly simple example, the U.S. military cannot be classified as purely Western. At the Battle of Cowpens in the American Revolution, the Continental Army employed deception to overwhelm a numerically superior British Army. The U.S. fought the Mexican War with a limited force utilizing an indirect strategy; ten years later in the Civil War, the U.S. fought a war of attrition and maneuver. The Chinese military in the Korean War demonstrated both a tendency toward deception as a key element in their operational plan, which Keegan points to as a non-Western characteristic of war, and the massive use of infantry, which Hanson points to as a Western characteristic of war. As military planners seeking to operationalize culture to better understand an adversary, we must design an instrument that is sufficiently broad to detect and measure as many of these component elements as possible, but be sufficiently concise to allow a

---

<sup>45</sup> Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, *Political Science Research Methods* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1991) 77.

summary in some meaningful way the relationship between culture and warfare while recognizing its limitations. Neither Lynn nor Porter provide this instrument but do lay the groundwork for understanding the nuances of culture and its limitation in anticipating future behavior.

The third challenge to the study of culture is oversimplification, which is often a product of examining culture from the aggregate. For example, studying the non-Western way of war, instead of limiting the study to simply China creates a broad generalization that is not a homogenous culture. There is a recognized cultural difference throughout the so-called non-Western world. One of the pitfalls of conducting a cultural examination of war is to make broad generalizations that prevent precision in understanding how a society conducts war. Lynn points to this several times by contrasting China with South Asia. He notes that during the Warring State Period, China fielded large armies composed of conscripts capable of large-scale infantry attacks at close-order. In contrast, around 500 B.C., South Asian forces seem not to have preferred infantry combat with shock weapons. This single example of diversity within non-Western warfare shows broad generalizations about cultural approaches to war to be false. In addition, the Chinese style of combat during the Warring States Period had more in common with Greek forms of battle and suggests that any belief in the mutual exclusivity of cultural traits in war is false.<sup>46</sup>

The search for a Western or non-Western way of war will ultimately be selective and ahistorical. Recent examples, like Hanson and Keegan, bypass history that fail to fit the framework established by the author instead of recognizing the range of cultural traits that determine how a society conducts war. “The dogma of cultural essentialism, then, often fails to deal with many of the complexities of military performance...And its empirical and conceptual shortcomings reflect a more fundamental problem. It sees what it wants to see in history, making

---

<sup>46</sup> Lynn, 70.

facts fit a theory to confirm its urgent contemporary agenda, which is to alert today's militaries and decision-makers to cultural differences."<sup>47</sup>

From previous attempts to understand war through an examination of culture, we can see an inclination toward oversimplification. Culture is difficult to categorize and scholarly attempts to better understand how culture effects behavior should be applauded. "It is an important corrective to naive ethnocentrism and to neo-classical realism, where actors pursue their structural material interests with culture reduced to background music." The pursuit of cultural understanding cannot result in simple dichotomies, which list characteristics and traits likely to be exemplified by a society, the idea that the West is modern and political while the non-West is primitive and indirect.

The fourth challenge to the study of culture is the conception that culture is fixed in time or at the very least semi-permanent. Farrell argues that culture itself is more or less consistent; but it must be viewed as an open system vulnerable to external or internal shock.<sup>48</sup> Military forces develop based on the culture of their societies but they also study, borrow, and copy from militaries around the world. Porter discusses what he terms the "hybridity" of war in which cultural traits exemplified in war are shared. Many examples exist of two different cultures copying attributes to create a better military organization. In late 16<sup>th</sup> century, Portuguese traders brought muskets to Japanese military forces that were able to adapt and develop a massive infantry force to invade Korea. Japan's development of military drills and tactics created a disciplined infantry force capable of conducting siege warfare reminiscent of early modern European counterparts.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Porter, 81.

<sup>48</sup> Theo Farrell, "World Culture and Military Power," *Security Studies* (July 2005): 450.

<sup>49</sup> Swope, Kenneth. "Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi's Second Invasion of Korea, 1597-1598," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 6 (2006): 200.

Other examples of hybridity include Mao Zedong's views on the meaning of war and politics, which were interpreted from Lenin who had studied Clausewitz. Mao wrote, "When politics develops to a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep away the obstacles in the way."<sup>50</sup> In addition, Vietnam's anti-colonial movement integrated ideas from Social Darwinism and Marxist-Leninism with Confucian idealism and Maoist guerrilla warfare.<sup>51</sup> Chinese Nationalists campaigns of encirclement against the communists in the early 1930s prior to the long march resembled a Western way of campaigning. The same is true among Western militaries that adapt to meet so-called non-Western challenges. British militias in North America copied the Native American Indian by creating light infantry that exchanged their redcoats for camouflage, shaved their heads, and sometimes painted their skins like Indians.<sup>52</sup> The Continental Army used deception in 1781 at the battle of Cowpens by conducting successive withdrawals throughout their depth to deceive British forces into believing Continental forces were defeated. These tactical deception operations allowed the Continental Army to plan a successful counter-attack to defeat the British forces.<sup>53</sup> General Eisenhower in World War II continuously integrated deception operations in the North African Campaign in 1942 and again in the 1944 invasion of Normandy.<sup>54</sup> Eisenhower's

---

<sup>50</sup> Mao Zedong, *On Protracted War, Selected Military Writings* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), 227. Lenin wrote "war is simply the continuation of politics by other...means." See V.I. Lenin, *The Collapse of the Second International, Collected Works*, vol 21 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 219. Mao only mentions Lenin and not Clausewitz whose original phrase was "War is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." See Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book 1, 87.

<sup>51</sup> Mark Philip Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: the Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 190.

<sup>52</sup> Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 92-103.

<sup>53</sup> Lawrence E. Babits, *A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 124-128.

<sup>54</sup> Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 48.

sequential and simultaneous use of deception, employment of advanced technology, and massive ground force operations demonstrates that a single army can demonstrate characteristics of so-called Western and non-Western war.

Keegan like Hanson argues for a culturally determined war, which ignores many cases to the contrary.<sup>55</sup> Paul Bracken endorses the idea of culturally determined war when he asks if there is an Eastern Way of War. “If the Eastern way of war is embodied by the stealthy archer, the metaphorical Western counterpart is the swordsman charging forward, seeking a decisive showdown, eager to administer the blow that will obliterate the enemy once and for all.”<sup>56</sup> All too often assertions such as this are based on the declaration that only two camps of military thought exist. Western warfare based on the writings of Clausewitz and non-Western warfare based on the ancient writings of Sun Tzu; instead of recognizing the multiple forms of warfare that can exist along a continuum between these points. Because of hybridity, which explains the study, borrowing, and copying of cultural traits of war, societies rarely exist on the far reaches of a continuum defined by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Porter articulates this point clearly with recent examples. Among them, the longest conventional war of the last half century was fought between Arabs and Persians in the Iraq-Iran War from 1980-1988. This war had devastating cost in human life and economic resources and was reminiscent of the Western front in World War I featuring positional combat over entrenched positions with the use of gas and continual waves of young men charging to their deaths. Secondly, one of the most elaborate deception operations in history was the product of a Western alliance in 1944. Operation Bodyguard masked the D-Day

---

<sup>55</sup> Keegan, 7.

<sup>56</sup> Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and The Second Nuclear Age* (New York, Harper Collins: 1999), 130.

Normandy Landings and misled the German intelligence system to such effect that the Germans continued to believe the Normandy landings were a feint<sup>57</sup>

Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was influenced heavily by both the Sun Tzu element of deception, which prevented five Iraqi Divisions from being committed to combat and the concept of mass, which finds its roots in Western military theory. These examples clearly articulate that deception, evasion, overwhelming force, and technology are not always mutually exclusive cultural traits, but exist along a range. Western forces use cultural traits that are expressed by some as non-Western. Sun Tzu's theory of war and focus on deception and evasion is not unique to non-Western cultures, but can also be observed in the Western writings of Machiavelli and Liddell Hart.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, cultural traits that exist in one conflict may not exist in others even when participants are from the same society.

Hanson points to ancient Greece as the birth of Western warfare epitomized by its clash of armies for the purpose of decisive battle. Ignored by Hanson was the Greek use of deception to gain tactical advantages over their adversaries. The Spartans at Thermopylae in 480 B.C. became experts at feigning defeat and running away only to turn and attack their pursuers.<sup>59</sup> Military forces in China in 208 B.C. at the Battle of Red Cliffs conducted similar tactical actions when deception became the decisive factor behind the allies' tactical victory.<sup>60</sup> Of course, the Battle of Thermopylae is not the only example of Greek use of deception, in the Peloponnesian war, Krentz identifies 37 instances of attacks based on deception or surprise.<sup>61</sup> The search for decisive

---

<sup>57</sup> Porter, 72.

<sup>58</sup> Niccolo, Machiaveli, *The Prince* (New York: Penguin Books, 1975) and Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Meridian, 1991).

<sup>59</sup> John Drogo Montagu, *Greek and Roman Warfare: Battles Tactics, and Trickery* (St. Paul: MBI Publishing, 2006), 69.

<sup>60</sup> James G. Pangelinan, "From Red Cliffs to Chosin: The Chinese Way of War" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010), 36-40.

<sup>61</sup> Peter Krentz, *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, ed. Hans van Wees, (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2009), 167-200.



battle does not properly characterize Greek or Western warfare as Hanson claims. Beatrice Heuser's study of the evolution of strategy shows that the "prevailing thinking and practice in the eight centuries between the age of Pericles and the late Roman Empire, in the fourteen centuries between Vegetius and the French Revolution, few believed either in the inevitability or the unconditional desirability of battle. Nor were battles always decisive."<sup>62</sup> Heuser supports the analysis of Krentz and Wees that deception, diplomacy, and other indirect approaches have always been a part of Western warfare and that views among Western strategists have been balanced between believing that defense is stronger and those favoring an offensive strategy.

Scholars who overstate the differences between Western and non-Western warfare fail to recognize the range in which culture is shared among different societies. Hanson points to discipline as a defining characteristic of Western warfare, but this same cultural trait is present in Chinese militaries during the Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.). The scale of conflict during this period in China expanded drastically, sustained by increasing agricultural productivity and expanding material prosperity. What used to be armies of only a few thousand grew to where even weak states fielded armies of 100,000 strong in the third century B.C., often maintaining a standing army.<sup>63</sup> Chinese leaders used large armies similar to Greek armies of the same time and according to Lynn, there is no reason to believe discipline was any less important to Chinese leaders than to Greek leaders. Anecdotal evidence suggests Chinese troops were skillfully trained and disciplined based on the size of their armies along with the scale and complexity of their maneuvers.<sup>64</sup> Chinese military classics support the need for coordinated and skilled armies that were obedient to commanders, and placed an importance on discipline. T'ai Kungs, *Six Secret*

---

<sup>62</sup> Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War From Antiquity To The Present* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010), 89.

<sup>63</sup> Ralph D. Sawyer, *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 8-13.

<sup>64</sup> Lynn, 38-39.

*Teachings* emphasizes the selection of warriors and the use of rewards and punishments to build cohesive armies.<sup>65</sup> These examples and others do not support the idea that discipline was a cultural trait exclusive to the Western warfare. This examination of Keegan and Hanson's argument is not an effort to discard culture but to inform the reader of its challenges in hopes to find a more complete and systematic understanding of how culture influences war.

In summary, the cultural study of war, although offering potential insights, is not without its methodological challenges. First, the difficulty in defining culture as an independent or dependent variable offers methodological challenges often ignored by scholars. John Keegan in his book *A History of Warfare* presents a thesis that war is an expression of culture and not politics without ever defining culture. Failure to define culture creates conceptual confusion, but the creation of a rigid definition fails to recognize that culture is an abstract and open system. Second, the use of nominal measurements provides the least information about phenomena and gives only a set of discrete categories to use in distinguishing between cases. Nominal measurements do not explain how much of the characteristic exists nor does it allow a rank order, but simply sorts cases into groups designated by the names used in a classificatory scheme.<sup>66</sup> The third methodological challenge is the level of analysis for culture tends to examine the aggregate of several cultures combined under one label such as the examination of non-Western cultures. This challenge can lead to a failure to understand the complexity involved with a cultural examination of the conduct of war. Finally, the expression of culture in deterministic or dogmatic conclusions draws oversimplified conclusions that mislead the reader who is unaware of the malleable nature of culture. An examination of culture must recognize the role of human agency

---

<sup>65</sup> Sawyer, 40-96.

<sup>66</sup> Manheim, 73-75.

in breaking free of cultural constraints.<sup>67</sup> Although this monograph does not claim to remove all of the main methodological challenges of studying culture as it relates to the conduct of war, it does present a method for military planners to operationalize culture in examining an adversary. Specifically this monograph outlines the use of ordinal measurements instead of nominal measurements to gain a deeper understanding of how culture influences warfare.

## **Methodology**

According to Hanson, the characteristics of Western warfare include the superiority of Western discipline, the supremacy of landed infantry, the singularity of Western technology, and individualism. Ultimately, Hanson develops the concept of a universal Western way of war, and by implication an equally universal and stereotyped non-Western, or Oriental way of war. Although the Chinese civilization gave the world gunpowder, according to Hanson it never developed the prerequisite receptive cultural environment that would allow those discoveries to be shared by the populace at large. The effective use of technology required the combination of rationalism and capitalism with an egalitarian tradition that did not exist in non-Western cultures. The absences of what Hanson implies are mutually exclusive characteristics allowed the West to achieve military dominance and that cases of non-Western victory over Western powers were most likely due to poor generalship by Western militaries as well as “Luck, individual initiative, and courage.”<sup>68</sup> The assertion by Hanson of Western dominance and its exclusive ownership of characteristics, which result in a superior operational approach to war, deserve to be tested. This methodology section first begins with an overview of ordinal measurements to understand its value as well as explain its limitations as a method for operational planners to conceptualize

---

<sup>67</sup> Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” Center on Contemporary Conflict, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Oct/lantisOct05.html> (accessed December 2011).

<sup>68</sup> Hanson, 23.

culture. Secondly, this section will construct an ordinal scale that can be applied to cases to determine if a Western way of war is distinct from non-Western warfare.

As noted above, Hanson's use of nominal measurements is at best limited in its explanatory power and most likely an invalid measurement for a subject as complex as culture. Hanson's use of nominal measurements is akin to using a ruler to measure weight. The way in which we measure a variable is important because it allows us to specify abstract concepts so that meaningful comparisons are made between a variable and the phenomenon. Inaccurate measurements interfere with testing and often lead to erroneous conclusions.<sup>69</sup> Imprecise measurements, such as Hanson's use of nominal measurements for culture, limit the extent of the comparisons made between observations and the precision of the knowledge that results from research. An abstract concept such as culture is inherently difficult to measure in a valid way and therefore always subject to criticism, but ordinal measurements overcome some of the imprecision.

An instrument such as an ordinal scale obtains indicators of the degree to which a variable exhibits value. The difference between a variable and a value is important to appreciate. A variable allows us to translate an abstract concept like culture into empirical terms. The value reveals the magnitude of a variable and subjects it to comparison or even statistical description if desired. The advantage of an ordinal measurement over a nominal measurement is simply that it provides more information. An ordinal measurement allows us to not just categorize and to rank order a phenomena, but allows us to associate a number with each case, which not only tells us

---

<sup>69</sup> Several references guide the development of this methodology, for additional information on ordinal measurements and scaling used by the author reference; Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, *Political Science Research Methods* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1991) and Jaro B. Manheim, Richard C. Lars Willnat, and Craig Brians, *Empirical Political Analysis: Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods* (New York: Pearson Education Inc, 2008). Chapter 5 and 14. Garing King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), Chapter 5. Paul M. Kellstedt and Guy D. Whitten, *Political Science Research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) Chapter 5 and 6.

the differences and similarities between cases, but also how it relates to other cases in terms of how much value of a variable it exhibits.

The use of an ordinal measurement therefore allows us to observe if cases have more or less of a variable. Ordinal measurements also allow the use of both inference and basic descriptive statistics to draw conclusions. Examining the median and mode of an ordinal measurement indicates the central tendency of cases, which can lead to pattern development. By examining the dispersion of measurements, the range of cases is revealed, the more cases that are examined the more predictive results can be. This monograph only examines three cases and therefore will rely on inference to draw conclusions. An important limitation to ordinal measurements is that it is not able to examine the exact difference between values, but only which cases demonstrate more or less of a variable.<sup>70</sup> Since ordinal measurements are not based on any standardized unit it does not allow us to tell how far cases are from one another, but only allows us to say that some have more or less of a variable than others.

The advantages inherent in ordinal measurements and the ability to develop a single number or score to represent a complex behavior offers a valuable method to conceptualize culture and determine if Western warfare is distinct from non-Western warfare. This section now turns its attention to the development of an ordinal scale that captures Hanson's variables of Western warfare and is capable of assigning value to each variable following the examination of a case. In order to construct a scale we must identify and combine a number of relatively narrow

---

<sup>70</sup> As an example "suppose we wanted to measure social trust of a group, and we believe that an individual who answers all three questions a certain way has more social trust than a person who answers two of the questions a certain way and this person has more social trust than a person who answers one of the questions a certain way and so on. We could assign a score of 3 to the first group, a 2 to the second group, a 1 to the first group and a 0 to those who did not answer any to the questions in a more socially trusting manner. In this case, the higher number, the more social trust an individual has. With an ordinal measure, it does not matter whether we assign to the four categories a 1 or a 10. The intervals between the numbers have no meaning; all that matters is that the higher numbers represent more of the attribute than the lower numbers do." Example provided by Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, *Political Science Research Methods* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1991), 78.

indicators into a single, summary measure that represents the variable. Since Hanson has already identified the variables (discipline, infantry, technology, and individualism) that describe a distinctive Western way of war, our job is to develop indicators to measure each variable and to combine those indicators into a summary score. The less a case study demonstrates a variable the lower the numerical score.

Because this study is constructing a scale intended to measure a rather abstract concept it is important to be transparent about how the indicators included in the scale were developed. This will ensure others can evaluate the scale and the indicators comprising it. Since this monograph is specifically addressing conclusions drawn by Hanson on the distinctiveness of a Western way of war and it is his variables that are being subjected to ordinal measurements, this monograph develops indicators based on his analysis of Western warfare. For example, in his discussion of Western discipline, Hanson distinguishes between courage and discipline, recognizes the presence of both fear and respect for military officers, and the Western emphasis on training and regulations as indicators of discipline. He also identifies the absence of discipline in non-Western forces by noting indicators of a poor organizational structure and a military system of coercion or forced impressments, which deplete a military forces level of discipline when in battle.<sup>71</sup> Hanson's nominal measurements examine the presence and absence of these variables, but an ordinal measurement recognizes that an indicator such as tactical training exists on a range and is not merely present or absent. The level of training also does not exist in a vacuum but deserves to be examined in concert with other indicators of discipline such as organizational structure and morale.

An important caveat to this methodology is on the subject of intercoder reliability, a widely used term for the extent to which independent coders evaluate a characteristic of an event or variable and reaches the same conclusion. Because this monograph develops its own ordinal

---

<sup>71</sup> Hanson, *Carnage and Culture*, 289-293.

scale and then codes case studies based on subjective professional experience and research, reliability and validity of the conclusions are weak. Intercoder reliability could be demonstrated during data collection if two or more researchers independently collect data that mirror each other. During analysis researchers should independently agree upon data segments to be coded and the placing of data segments into the same categories, resulting in the same interpretations. Because this monograph does not ensure intercoder reliability, differences among results of replicated studies should be expected given the dynamic and inductive ways in which qualitative researchers generate and interpret data. Therefore, the analysis and scoring of participants in each case study were based on the personal assessment of the author.

This ordinal scale utilizes a three point scale, because ordinal measurements do not include equal or even known intervals between values, the coding is free to employ numbers of any magnitude.<sup>7273</sup> However, the coding is constrained in that it must preserve the relative positions of values and be properly ordered from lowest to highest. Simply stated, a value of “1” demonstrates a variable is observed at a lower magnitude than a value of “3”. In the interest of parsimony, the value rankings of 1, 2, and 3 are sufficient.

The coding scheme in table 1.1 summarizes the indicators used in the study with their associated values when analyzing the variable discipline. The advantage to creating a coding scheme is that it creates an operational definition for each variable, something that Hanson never does when describing his variables. There is no explicit way for a reader to know exactly how Hanson operationalizes and interprets his variables, so this monograph relies on subjective analysis and professional judgment. A coding scheme satisfies this requirement and provides a guide for what we are looking for when analyzing a case study.

---

<sup>72</sup> Judith Harris, *The Challenge of Intercoder Agreement in Qualitative Inquiry* (Austin, University of Texas, 2010), 5.

<sup>73</sup> The term coding refers to the process of assigning numerical values to our observations. The assigned coding is a mechanism for making a precise and lasting record of the information.

**Table 1.1** Coding scheme for cultural variable of *discipline*

| <b>Variable</b> | <b>Indicator</b>  | <b>Value</b> |
|-----------------|---|--------------|
| Discipline      | 1) Military system based on coercion or forced impressments of soldiers.<br>2) Tactical actions are spontaneous or haphazard with minimal planning effort with limited practice of operational art.<br>3) Only limited warfare experience at senior levels of command.  | 1            |
|                 | 1) Military system is maintained through regular salaries and contracts for supply.<br>2) Operational art is conducted at senior levels of command, providing a shared vision for the conduct of operations.<br>3) Some combat experience exists at the tactical and operational levels of a military organization.   | 2            |
|                 | 1) Military system is built around regulations that allow the sustainment of soldiers with food, clothing, and pay.<br>2) Military force demonstrates constant communication between units horizontally and vertically to achieve unity of effort.<br>3) Combat experience exists at all levels of command and includes an experienced formation of soldiers. | 3            |

Hanson's use of the variable infantry to describe Western warfare deserves an explanation. In his description of the battle of Poitiers in 732, he does not use the variable infantry to describe simply the use of dismounted soldiers in battle or to refer to the size of an infantry force. Instead, Hanson is describing a Western tradition of willingly meeting an enemy on a field of battle as opposed to the non-Western tradition of mounted warfare, which seeks to utilize mobility, superior numbers, and individual skill to defeat an adversary. To Hanson the use of infantry was a continuance of the classical tradition of "mustering free men into a large infantry force, in which citizens, not slaves or impressed serfs, formed the corps of the army."<sup>74</sup> Infantry represents a nuanced cultural assertion not just describing the preferred method of warfare (static vs. mobile), but the political status of soldiers who comprise a military force and the doctrine or history that informed tactical innovations. Table 1.2 provides a summary of the

---

<sup>74</sup> Hanson , 146.



indicators that provides insight to the variable infantry, which are used to examine each case study participant.

**Table 1.2** Coding scheme for cultural variable of *infantry*

| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Indicator</i>   | <i>Value</i> |
|-----------------|--|--------------|
| Infantry        | 1) Soldiers comprising a military force are subservient to an ideology or are a product of serfdom.<br>2) Military demonstrates a preference for mounted attack to outflank or unhinge an adversary by rapid movement.<br>3) Professional military education did not examine an operational level of war.  | 1            |
|                 | 1) Soldiers are volunteers and some civilian control exists over the military.<br>2) Military conducts frontal attacks at the tactical and operational level of war with limited effort to shape the deep fight.<br>3) Only limited doctrine exists within the military force to inform commanders on the operational level of war.  | 2            |
|                 | 1) Military force is not only comprised of freemen, but civilian control of the military exists in which civilians are subject to audit after battle.<br>2) Military attempts to achieve shock throughout the depth of an adversary to enhance the effectiveness of the close fight.<br>3) Professional military education integrates theory with history to provide commanders with pragmatic advice on operations. | 3            |

The critical role of Western technology in warfare according to Hanson was birthed from a Hellenic tradition of natural inquiry. This tradition of technological superiority developed from a propensity to “think abstractly, to debate knowledge freely apart from religion and politics, and to devise ways of adapting theoretical breakthroughs for practical use.”<sup>75</sup> The result of this rationalism is a tradition of technological superiority that has allowed Western cultures to sustain a military force with sophisticated weaponry and enhance its operational reach while preventing culmination. The variable of technology can be observed in two ways, first, by examining the ability of military forces to adapt to an adversary through critical thinking and apply a technological solution. Secondly, technology is observed through the ability of a military force to sustain a campaign and prevent culmination. Table 1.3 provides a summary of the indicators that provides insight to the variable technology, which is used to examine each case study participant.

---

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 230.

**Table 1.3** Coding scheme for cultural variable of *technology*

| <b>Variable</b> | <b>Indicator</b>  | <b>Value</b> |
|-----------------|---|--------------|
| Technology      | 1) A general absence of a systematic approach to abstract learning and science.<br>2) Only able to sustain a campaign for short durations prior to culmination.   | 1            |
|                 | 1) Military force demonstrates the ability for ad hoc development of technology to adapt to an adversary.<br>2) Capable of campaigning, but eventually induces culmination due to a lack of logistical support and operational reach.   | 2            |
|                 | 1) Military force not only demonstrates ability for ad hoc development of technology, but also is reinforced by an industry, which ensures obsolescence almost simultaneously with the creation of new arms.<br>2) Capable of sustaining a military force without inducing culmination. | 3            |

Hanson describes Western warfare as placing a premium on individualism, while non-Western warfare is characterized by willingness to subordinate individuality completely to family, village or nation.<sup>76</sup> According to Hanson it is Western faith in “individuality rather than group consensus, spontaneity rather than rote, and informality rather than hierarchy” that proves decisive in warfare.<sup>77</sup>

Individualism manifests based on the personal freedoms and liberties present in a society that fields a military force and the flexibility within a military command that allows alteration to an operation. The formal and often legal recognition of personal freedoms by constitutional government’s foster liberalization and in the process cultivate personal curiosity and initiative. Flexible military commands provide broad mission order to allow individual decisions and impromptu ingenuity.<sup>78</sup> Table 1.4 provides a summary of the indicators that provides insight to the variable individualism, which are used to examine each case study participant.

---

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 369.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 370.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 384-386.

**Table 1.4** Coding scheme for cultural variable of *individualism*

| <b>Variable</b> | <b>Indicator</b>  | <b>Value</b> |
|-----------------|---|--------------|
| Individualism   | 1) Centralized government that denies personal freedoms to the society.<br>2) Supreme civilian or military authority in which subordinate commanders follow formal and dogmatic protocols.                            | 1            |
|                 | 1) Authoritarian government or obeisance to imperial or divine authority, which subjugates the individual to the society.<br>2) Centralized military authority in which detailed orders create a reluctance to adapt. | 2            |
|                 | 1) Constitutional government that explicitly promotes personal freedoms.<br>2) A flexible system of command that promotes and accepts alteration to orders by subordinate commanders.                                 | 3            |

This methodology for operationalizing culture allows for an analysis of case studies to identify indicators and determine to what extent a participant in a conflict displays a specific variable of culture. If Hanson's thesis is correct, then Western warfare will be observed at a value of 3 and non-Western warfare will be observed at a value of 1. For this monograph, the ordinal scale is applied to analyze three historical case studies to determine if Western warfare is distinctive from non-Western warfare.

The criterion for selection of cases is first to choose historical cases in which the indicators for each variable are observed through the research of primary and secondary sources. Second, cases were selected to cover the range of possible participants in the modern era of warfare.<sup>79</sup> This means, cases were selected to examine two conflicts in which one participant is non-Western and the other is Western. A third case was selected to examine conflicts in which each of the two major participants is expected to demonstrate non-Western warfare. The use of only three cases does not allow for a definitive answer on the distinctiveness of Western and non-Western warfare, but provides a starting point to assess the validity of Hanson's theory. It also

---

<sup>79</sup> This monograph considers the modern era to be best represented by conflicts of the 20<sup>th</sup> century onward in which mechanization and firepower were observed at unprecedented levels. The 1904 Russo-Japanese War is considered by many scholars to be the first modern war.

allows the methodology of ordinal measurements to be applied as an example of military planners searching for a way to operationalize culture in their examination of an adversary.

Case study sections provide a brief historical background followed by an analysis of the major participants, which summarizes the indicators. Each section contains a table that explicitly assigns a value to each variable for the respective participant. The first case study selected is the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War in which Russia demonstrates a more non-Western approach while Japan demonstrates a more Western approach to warfare. The second case study is the Korean War (1950-1953) in which China and the United States is examined as the two major participants. China is expected to demonstrate a non-Western approach to war, while the U.S. represents a Western approach to war. The final case study is the Sino-Vietnam War (1979) in which we examine two non-Western states and their approach to warfare.

## **The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)**

### **Historical Setting**

In 1904, it was the Japanese who were more prepared than the Russians to wage a war. The Japanese operational plans established objectives of neutralizing the Russian Pacific Squadron, then landing two field armies, one to seize Port Arthur and the other to seize Liaoyang before Russia could deploy additional forces to Manchuria. Through the course of the war, the Japanese demonstrated careful preparation, surprise, initiative, speed, and flexibility to exploit Russian weaknesses while maximizing their advantages.<sup>80</sup> The Japanese already had an opportunity to test its newly modernized military during the Sino-Japanese War (1894), which resulted in the Shimonoseki Treaty signed on April 17, 1895. The treaty ceded control of Port Arthur to Japan, which quickly raised Russian concerns over Japanese expansion in China. In

---

<sup>80</sup> Bruce W. Menning, *Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army 1861-1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 153-155.

reaction, the combined diplomatic efforts of Germany, France, and Russia forced Japan to return Port Arthur to China in exchange for monetary compensation.<sup>81</sup>

In 1898, Russia leased Port Arthur from China for 25 years and was allowed to extend the Trans-Siberian railroad to the port. By 1902, in order to protect its newly acquired interests, Russia stationed 25,000 troops with six batteries of artillery in Manchuria.<sup>82</sup> In an effort to secure its interests, Japan continued diplomatic efforts in 1903 to divide commercial interests in Manchuria and Korea with Russia. These efforts failed and on February 6, 1904, Japan severed diplomatic ties with Russia stating in an official message that Japan “reserved the right to pursue an independent course of action ...to safeguard her interests and rights.”<sup>83</sup> Two days later, Japan launched an attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur.

## **Analysis of Participants**

Over the course of the war, Japan's efforts to modernize its military forces would surprise and prove devastating for the Russian military. In the mid-nineteenth century, Japan was still a feudal society and had little interest in foreign relations, but their desire not to be exploited by foreign powers motivated Japan to enter the industrial age. The following decades were marked by Japan changing from a feudal society to a market economy much like Europe, which included modernizing not just its society but also its military force. In 1867, Japan integrated French instructors to teach the army new methods of warfare and opened a military academy. In 1885, Germany also began to train and instruct the Japanese army in which the German Chief of Staff, General Moltke (Sr.), approved the education programming of many of the Japanese generals that

---

<sup>81</sup> James Sisemore, “The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons not learned,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School for Advanced Military Studies, 2003), 5-10.

<sup>82</sup> *The Russo-Japanese War: Russian Official Account*, part 1 trans. Claudine Wannamaker, 1937, Special Collections, Combined Arms Research Library, USACGSOC, Fort Leavenworth. 37-38.

<sup>83</sup> Alexei Kuropatkin, *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*. vol 1 trans. A. Lindsay and ed. E. Swinton (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1909), 270.

served in the Russo-Japanese War.<sup>84</sup> While Japan was developing a professional military education system, the Russian army had few requirements for academic studies for promotion. “Much of Russia’s officer corps, including all of its general officers were promoted by favor and not abilities.”<sup>85</sup> In 1903, only 30 percent of Russia’s regimental commanders and approximately one-half of its infantry division commanders were graduates of the General Staff Academy.<sup>86</sup>

By 1904, Japan developed an infantry force of 257,000 and 13,000 cavalry with a reserve of 400,000.<sup>87</sup> At the same time, Russia had an active army of 1,100,000 soldiers and a reserve of 2,400,000, but only committed 98,000 maneuver troops and 25,000 garrison troops to Manchuria.<sup>88</sup> An additional 24,000 soldiers were assigned to secure the Trans-Siberian railroad.<sup>89</sup>

Japan supported its military modernization by committing an extraordinary amount of capital to developing an industry that supplied the army with weaponry and the ability to sustain a military campaign. By 1895, Japan was spending approximately 26 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) on its military and by 1904, this amount increased to \$466 million.<sup>90</sup> This investment allowed the Japanese army to increase from six to thirteen divisions and build a naval force to support the army’s invasion of Manchuria extending Japan’s operational reach.<sup>91</sup> Unlike Japan, Russia had not built a military force capable of sustaining its forces in Manchuria. Russia’s

---

<sup>84</sup> Ernst Presseisen, *Before Aggression, Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army* (Tucson, University of Arizona, 1965), 9-11 and 101-105.

<sup>85</sup> Sisemore, 10.

<sup>86</sup> Menning, 102.

<sup>87</sup> Robert Porter, *Japan: The Rise of a Modern Power* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919), 168.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 169.

<sup>89</sup> Menning, 20.

<sup>90</sup> Kan’chi. Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict, Its Causes and Issues* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 1905), 80.

<sup>91</sup> Sisemore, 10.

primary weakness was the single-track railroad for resupply of both material and personnel, which prevented Russia's ability to seize the initiative throughout the war.<sup>92</sup>

The experience level of each army played a critical role. Japan had tested its military force against China in 1894; the Russian Army "was in various stages of preparedness."<sup>93</sup> The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 was Russia's most recent major conflict. A Military Historical Commission gathered lessons learned and recommendations to reform the Russian military, but these reforms never occurred due to the assassination of Czar Alexander II. When Alexander III assumed control, military reform was ended and "returned the government and the military to an autocratic society."<sup>94</sup> Despite the lack of experience in the Russian military, they did have advantages in technology. The Russian army fielded a new quick-fire artillery piece (Model 1900, 3 inch) that was superior to Japanese artillery. In addition the Russian military designed the first man-portable mortar system. However, Russian field artillery soldiers lacked proper training to employ this new technology accurately, while the well-trained Japanese artillery soldiers could fire indirectly using observers to direct fires from hidden battery positions.<sup>95</sup>

**Table 2.1** Coding Values: Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)

| <i>Participant</i> | <i>Variable</i> | <i>Value</i> |
|--------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Russia             | Discipline      | 1            |
|                    | Infantry        | 2            |
|                    | Technology      | 2            |
|                    | Individualism   | 1            |
| Japan              | Discipline      | 3            |
|                    | Infantry        | 2            |
|                    | Technology      | 3            |
|                    | Individualism   | 2            |

<sup>92</sup> J. Ware, *Discussion of the Influence of the Trans-Siberian Railroad on the Plans and Operations of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905*, Individual Report, 1931, Special Collections, Combined Arms Research Library, USACGSOC, Fort Leavenworth, 4-7.

<sup>93</sup> Sisemore, 10.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 11.

Table 2.1 provides a summary of scoring for each variable by participant. By the end of the war, Japan demonstrated that over the past half-century its efforts to modernize allowed for the effective use of its military as a political instrument. Japan and Russia offer an intriguing first case study. Japan throughout its history has demonstrated a propensity to use characteristics of both Western and non-Western warfare, although scoring indicates that in 1905 Japan clearly demonstrated a more Western way of war. Japan's efforts to modernize during the Meiji Restoration in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century resulted in the integration of European attributes into its formerly feudal society. Russia, still under control of the Czar had never really embraced Western characteristics despite its proximity and interaction with Europe. Neither Russia nor Japan demonstrate a purely Western or non-Western form of warfare in 1905, but do demonstrate clear propensities. This case study also points out that simply because a society is located in the non-Western world, it is not necessarily willing to conform to that form of warfare. At least in this case study characteristics of Western warfare are not limited to the Western world.

## **The Korean War (1950-1953)**

### **Historical Setting**

Prior to the arrival European forces in the far east, Chinese military thought developed in a context very different than that of most Western military thinking. European states had to face the likelihood of a real external threat to their national existence. Due to the size and geography of China, "no such threat existed until the advent of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century."<sup>96</sup> Prior to the decline of the Ming Dynasty, Chinese military thought was colored by the

---

<sup>96</sup> Jonathan R. Adelman, *Symbolic War: The Chinese use of Force, 1840-1980* (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1993) 32.



philosophy of Sun Tzu, which advocated attacking of the enemy's plan, the employment of deception to subdue an enemy, the use of maneuver, and indirect methods to achieve victory.<sup>97</sup>

The history of the Chinese military from 1839 until 1950 is one of continued failure and instability. Unlike Japan, China did not adapt and modernize its industry, economy, or military forces despite their poor performances in every conflict from the Opium war to the Sino-Japanese War, and its several domestic conflicts epitomized by the Taiping and Boxer Rebellions. In 1950, China was emerging from 13 years of protracted warfare with Japan and a civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomintang.

## **Analysis of Participants**

The proclamation of the People's Republic of China in October of 1949 did not necessarily mark the end of conflict in China. China's domestic infrastructure was shattered and required massive amounts of economic aid. Hyperinflation and destruction from the past several years of war was even more complicated by military requirements to suppress remaining opposition in Taiwan and Tibet while protecting its continental borders from Guomintang naval and air power. In June 1950, Mao began to demobilize the PLA and the restructure the budget, allocating less than 10 percent of the budget for the military compared to over 40 percent in 1949.<sup>98</sup> Emerging from the civil war, the PLA was a poorly equipped army without significant armor, navy, airplanes, air defense, anti-tank capability, communications equipment, or modern logistics.<sup>99</sup> In order to build the PLA and an industry to support the needs of the military, Mao predicted China would need three to five years of peace.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>97</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77-78.

<sup>98</sup> Samuel Griffith, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 103.

<sup>99</sup> Robert Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: Free Press, 1975), 124-126.

<sup>100</sup> Bruce A. Elleman, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 237.

Although the PLA was limited in its capabilities, the military power of the U.S. in 1950 had degraded tremendously since the end of World War II. Decreasing from 12 million men and an 82 billion dollar defense budget in 1949 to 1.6 million men and a 13 billion dollar defense budget in 1950, the U.S. military was relatively under strength. Only four divisions were stationed in Japan at 2/3 strength and only 98 tanks.<sup>101</sup> The advantage of the U.S. was technology which had been developed through the infrastructure build up prior to and during World War II. This infrastructure remained intact and capable of building military power quickly.

Prior to entering the war, a Chinese intelligence report provided a clear contrast between U.S. and Chinese technology and capabilities, “an American corps (composed of two infantry divisions and a mechanized division) has 1,500 guns of 70mm to 240mm caliber, including tank cannons and anti-aircraft guns. In comparison, each of our (PLA) armies (composed of three divisions) has only 36 such guns.”<sup>102</sup> Chinese military leaders also knew the U.S. would dominate the air, while Chinese pilots were just starting to be trained.

China entered the Korean War under the name of the People’s Volunteer Troops, having massed 320,000 soldiers in Manchuria. Upon their entry into the war, the Chinese army enjoyed certain advantages, first there was a 75-mile gap between Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps. Second, the United Nations ground forces were outnumbered with only 247,000 soldiers. Third, the Chinese soldiers were more experienced in battle and more disciplined than American Soldiers.<sup>103</sup> Although the U.S. enjoyed a technological superiority, this was sometimes negated by Chinese experience at conducting night operations, camouflage during the day, and movement over rugged terrain.

---

<sup>101</sup> Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 58-73.

<sup>102</sup> Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, *Mao’s Generals Remember Korea* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 12

<sup>103</sup> Adelman, 184.

Both forces suffered from logistical problems, which hindered operations. Chinese offensives would often culminate due to a lack of adequate supplies and weapons larger than mortars. A pressing problem for China was the lack of weapons standardization among units. Since almost all of the PLA's equipment was captured from either Japanese or Guodoming forces, China weapons inventory included a range of models, calibers, and capabilities. The military industrial base of China could not support the diverse requirements of the weapon systems employed by the Chinese military. "In fact, the backward and war-ruined Chinese industry was able to produce only several thousand tons of ammunition a year, in contrast to the million-ton annual capacity of the United States."<sup>104</sup>

U.S. officers were well educated and were products of a mature professional military education system and although lacking experience at junior levels of command most senior officers benefited from combat experience during World War II. Not all US soldiers and officers were volunteers. In December 1950, President Truman declared a national emergency and increased the number of Selective Service inductions from 9,781 in 1949 to 1,529,539 men from 1950 to 1953.<sup>105</sup> The U.S. army was by no means completely made up of draftees; another 1.3 million soldiers volunteered during the same period.<sup>106</sup>

Chinese officers and soldiers were not well educated, were products of experience, and did not have a doctrinal base of knowledge. Instead, Chinese officers formed their beliefs from the communist ideology.<sup>107</sup> Most of the leaders, including Mao, had never visited the West. The CCP isolation during the Yenan period (1936-1945) and Chinese Civil War (1946-1949)

---

<sup>104</sup> Xiaobing, 13.

<sup>105</sup> Selective Service System, Induction Statistics. In Induction (by year) from World War I Through the End of the Draft (1973), <http://www.sss.gov/induct.htm> (accessed January 13, 2012).

<sup>106</sup> John Whiteclay Chambers, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: Free Press, 1987), 255-256.

<sup>107</sup> Bevin Alexander, *Korea: The First War We Lost* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), chapter 41.

reinforced a highly abstract view of the world. CCP leaders who had traveled abroad (Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping) had only brief experiences in the 1920s Europe.<sup>108</sup> Although the Chinese forces in Korea were labeled People's Volunteers, the term volunteer was intended to avoid a humiliating public defeat for China and to avoid an official confrontation with the U.S. and the United Nations.<sup>109</sup> It is difficult to ascertain the level of commitment each Chinese soldier had to the Korean War, but under communist rule the ability to own land did not exist, which according to Hanson provides insights as to the commitment a soldier will display in combat.

Although China demonstrated civilian control over the military, the military system was not flexible as evidenced by China's decision to enter the Korean conflict despite the reservations of many senior military commanders. PLA field commanders repeatedly requested better equipment and a delay of the intervention. "As early as August 1950, the commanders of the Thirteenth Army Group suggested in a joint letter to Zhu De, the PLA's commander in chief, that adequate air cover, anti-aircraft guns, and logistic supplies were vital to a possible victory in Korea."<sup>110</sup> The same commanders made a final appeal after Mao's final decision to intervene, requesting a two to three month delay, this appeal was rejected and field commanders were ordered to proceed.

Following the first offensive, Chinese field commanders in December 1950 believed that "CPV forces had already been stretched to their limit and a continuous push would drain their strength and spirit."<sup>111</sup> Peng Dehuai, a field commander did not want to undertake an all-out offensive and cabled Mao, requesting he consider flexibility for the next action and not advance to within 10km of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. Mao refused to give up his plan and Peng had to accept Mao's

---

<sup>108</sup> Adelman, 172.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 185.

<sup>110</sup> Xiaobing, 13.

<sup>111</sup> Shu Guang Zhang, *Chinese Warfighting, the PLA experience since 1949*, ed. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (London: CNA Corporation, 2003), 103.

request despite reservations.<sup>112</sup> The initial offensives of the Chinese military were not satisfactory to the field commanders and held the “ineffective, poorly coordinated command system partially responsible.”<sup>113</sup>

**Table 2.2** Coding Values: Korean War (1950-1953)

| <i>Participant</i>         | <i>Variable</i> | <i>Value</i> |
|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| People's Republic of China | Discipline      | 2            |
|                            | Infantry        | 2            |
|                            | Technology      | 1            |
|                            | Individualism   | 1            |
| United States              | Discipline      | 3            |
|                            | Infantry        | 3            |
|                            | Technology      | 3            |
|                            | Individualism   | 3            |

Table 2.2 provides the summary scoring for each participant in the Korean War. The scoring indicates that the U.S. displayed a war-fighting propensity consistent with the variables of Western warfare. China displayed a propensity for non-Western warfare, although the variable discipline stands apart primarily due to China’s previous war fighting experience and ability to maintain a large military force with a professional officer corps. China was not able to display superior technology because of its many years of war, which destroyed much of its military industry and economic strength. The technology China was able to display in Korea was largely due to assistance from the Soviet Union, in terms of equipment, training, and monetary loans. In the case of the Korean War, an analysis of the two major participants seems to support Hanson’s theory of two distinctive ways of war.

---

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 99-103.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 105.

# The Sino-Vietnam War (1979)

## Historical Setting

The Sino-Vietnam War is traditionally portrayed as a punitive campaign in response to the foreign and domestic policies of Vietnam in 1979. Any historical analysis of the relationship between Vietnam and China reveals two-thousand years of interaction fraught with continued border incidents even after Vietnamese independence in the tenth century. The last Chinese military intervention in Vietnam was in 1789 at the start of the collapse of the Ming Dynasty proving that “Vietnam was secure only when China was weak and divided or threatened by northern barbarians.”<sup>114</sup> As a Southern tributary to China, Vietnam had absorbed Confucian culture and had a population of over a million Chinese. The later development of the Vietnamese Communist Party was founded in Hong Kong in 1930 and adopted a platform similar to the CCP. China had provided aid to Viet Minh against the French and later against the U.S. during its war to control South Vietnam. China also had provided logistic and training support to the Vietnamese war effort along with supplies, materials, and personnel.<sup>115</sup>

Several factors are responsible for the rising tension between Vietnam and China. First, the violent Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s created a Chinese fear of encirclement as Vietnam and the Soviet Union relations prospered. This fear of encirclement was only heightened when Vietnam signed a twenty-five year defense treaty with the Soviet Union. Secondly, China’s domestic problems, epitomized by the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 and the purge of the Gang of Four, only served to increase friction with Vietnam in light of their renewed engagement with the Soviet Union. The new leadership under Deng Xiaoping consolidated power in 1978 and promoted the Four Modernizations program, which sought Western technology and

---

<sup>114</sup> Charles Patrick Fitzgerald, *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 19-24.

<sup>115</sup> Adelman, 222.

required a peaceful international environment in order to recover from the policies of the Cultural Revolution. To advance these domestic policies Deng began to normalize relations with the U.S. and begin economic transformation. Third, territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands and Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Cambodia continued to increase tensions between the two states.<sup>116</sup> Another underlying, but often-dismissed factor was the poor treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Some scholars dismiss this factor and believe China used the poor treatment of ethnic Chinese as a reason to build public anger and gain support for military action.<sup>117</sup> By July 1978, China closed its border with Vietnam and over the next six months over 200 border incidents occurred in which dozens of Chinese were killed.<sup>118</sup>

## **Analysis of Participants**

China's four-week punitive campaign mobilized 225,000 soldiers giving them a 2:1 superiority over 100,000 Vietnamese troops over half of which were local militia in the northern provinces of Vietnam. China also employed 1,200 tanks and 1,500 heavy artillery pieces in support of the military campaign.<sup>119</sup> However, the PLAs numerical superiority was negated by their shortage in critical items such as trucks and armored personnel carriers. Their tactical communications were primitive and often orders were transmitted by foot soldiers moving from division to division. Just as in the Korean War, logistical problems plagued the PLA. The artillery

---

<sup>116</sup> Elleman, 284-286.

<sup>117</sup> Henry J. Kenny, *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949* ed. Mark Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, (New York: CNA Corporation, 2003), 223.

<sup>118</sup> Pao-min Cheng, *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 46-50. Not included in this count is from December 1978 until February 1979 there were over 700 border clashes with over 300 Chinese killed.

<sup>119</sup> Adelman, 226.

was short of ammunition and most of the front line did not receive food and water because supplies had to be transported by peasants.<sup>120</sup>

The PLA had not modernized since the Korean War, guided by Mao's military theory on strategy, which emphasized manpower-over-weapons. For many years, the PLA regarded Mao's theory of men over weapons as an "iron law of people's war."<sup>121</sup> Although the PLA recognized their technological inferiority in the Korean War, military modernization made almost no progress. The Four Modernizations program of Deng began to change this perception in 1978 when Tao Hanzhang, deputy commandant of the PLA Academy wrote an article urging military modernization. He argued "China must not only catch up with U.S. and Soviet military technology but pursue correct military theory and establish a modern command system as well."<sup>122</sup> From this statement and others, we can observe that advocates of military modernization were engaged in a campaign against the traditional resistance to modernization of weaponry and military thinking. However, before modernization could begin, the war with Vietnam started and it was fought with out of date equipment and under the strategy of people's war.

Deng Xiaoping was named the overall commander of the punitive campaign and additional authorities came directly from the CCP central command. Two fronts were created, the Northern and the Southern Front commanded by military leaders. Along both fronts China massed a numerically superior force along the border following Mao's strategy that "in every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force." Manpower was placed by the PLA as the decisive factor with military objectives being the occupation of key provincial towns, destruction

---

<sup>120</sup> Elleman, 293.

<sup>121</sup> King C. Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 98.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 100.



of Vietnamese military forces, and destroying Vietnamese economic bases.<sup>123</sup> The Vietnamese strategy also looked to the strategy of people's war to blunt Chinese attacks. They employed local military along the border while assembling regular army forces in the plain south of Cao Bang and Lang Son. Their intent was to attrit Chinese forces at the border and set conditions for a major battle with the Chinese in the plain, which was outside of the PLA artillery range and logistical support.<sup>124</sup> Although the PLA movement was slow and often disrupted a surprisingly strong defense, by February 26, the PLA seized several border cities, but did so with a high number of casualties on both sides. On March 5, the PLA began to withdraw announcing the end of the punitive campaign and declaring victory.

Despite heavy losses on both sides, the PLA had achieved about half of their limited objectives and maintained initiative following closely its plan for advance and retreat. The PLA managed to operate in unfamiliar, rugged terrain, and adapted well to the guerilla tactics of Vietnam conducting anti-tunnel and anti-mine warfare. Although the numerically superior PLA partially destroyed several Vietnamese regular divisions their primary weakness in addition to a lack of modern weapons and logistics, was the lack of battle experience. This is demonstrated first by the inability to low ranking officers to make independent judgments and coordinate operations at critical moments and secondly by low morale which is cited as a reason for some of the ineffective assaults.<sup>125</sup>

Although both sides claimed victory, neither achieved all of its major objectives. The PLA did not destroy any of Vietnam's strong divisions, it did not force the Vietnamese army to

---

<sup>123</sup> Nguyen Hu'u Thuy, *The Chinese Aggression: Why and How it Failed* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979), 4.

<sup>124</sup> Chen, 106-108.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 113-116. Low morale was noted by examples of superior officers having to force their men to advance. Moral issues were also seen in the rear. Vietnamese mass media also publicized the Chinese morale problem as one of the three factors of China's defeat (the other reasons being poor logistics and regional forces that isolated and defeated Chinese forces).

withdraw from Cambodia, and it did not influence Vietnam to change its policy toward Chinese residents in Vietnam. China's only real achievement in this war was to raise doubts about the Soviet Union's willingness to intervene with force against China on Vietnam's behalf.<sup>126</sup>

**Table 2.3** Coding Values: Sino-Vietnam War (1979)

| <i>Participant</i>         | <i>Variable</i> | <i>Value</i> |
|----------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| People's Republic of China | Discipline      | 2            |
|                            | Infantry        | 2            |
|                            | Technology      | 1            |
|                            | Individualism   | 1            |
| Vietnam                    | Discipline      | 2            |
|                            | Infantry        | 1            |
|                            | Technology      | 1            |
|                            | Individualism   | 2            |

Table 2.3 provides the summary scoring for each participant in the Sino-Vietnam War. Scoring indicates that although neither China nor Vietnam demonstrate a purely non-Western way of war, there is little propensity toward Western warfare. China, almost 30 years after the Korean War continues to approach warfare in a very similar way. China had not changed, potentially due to its population's subservience to a communist ideology, which hindered personal freedoms. At least according to Hanson's theory of Western warfare, personal freedom is the catalyst for the development of technology. Vietnam was subject to similar subservience to the communist ideology, but managed to create a more flexible command system that allowed for discipline and individualism to be highlighted. This is potentially because of its recent experience against the U.S. in the Vietnam War of the late 1960s and early 1970s. An examination of military capabilities and cultural indicators prior to the onset of war, would anticipate both China and Vietnam to conduct a more non-Western form of warfare.

---

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 115,-117.

## Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to determine if Western warfare was distinctly different from non-Western warfare. Central to this study was the development of an ordinal scale that allows cultural variables to be operationalized in their examination of case studies. Ordinal scaling allows the measurement of abstract concepts by examining indicators. The examination of three cases appears to support Hanson's theory of a distinctive Western way of war, although some cases fail to capture many of the nuances that exist in warfare. Instead of visualizing a dichotomy in warfare, it seems more accurate to describe two categories of war with blurred boundaries, in which societies are free to borrow, adopt, or share different characteristics of warfare. A larger number of cases need to be examined to provide a definitive conclusion as to the merit of Hanson's theory, as well as the establishment intercoder reliability to provide validity to the conclusion. Based on personal assessment of three cases using the ordinal scale outlined above, Western warfare appears distinctive from non-Western warfare.

More important for the purposes of this monograph is the utility of ordinal measurements to examine culture prior to the onset of war. In the era of globalization, a military planning team's ability to understand and apply culture in ways that provide meaningful insights is of increasing importance. A planning team attempting to examine the operational environment of an adversary with the goal of being able to potentially anticipate its approach to warfare often relies on broad generalizations, which are far too open to interpretation and lack precision. Ordinal measurements offer a more systematic method to examine culture and assist a planning team in anticipating an adversary's approach to warfare.

Any planning team attempting to use ordinal measurements must still be aware of its limitations. First, ordinal measurements are still open to interpretation and subject to influence by an individual or a team's inherent biases, assumptions, research, and goals. Human agency is not removed from this process and the possibility of misinterpretation or mirror imaging remains possible and must be guarded against. Secondly, ordinal measurements may assist a planning

team in anticipating an adversaries approach to war, but it is not predictive. Culture is always subject to change, as Lynn theorizes, the discourse of war and the reality of war are rarely equal. In addition, culture is not a determinant of warfare, strategic positioning, economic means, and military capability along with other variables all influence warfare and need to be considered appropriately by a planning team. For these reasons the continuous need to reassess the operational environment is paramount to the iterative nature of military planning. Through this monograph and the case studies above military planners are provided a way to operationalize culture and apply it to create a better understanding of how an adversary will approach warfare and this methodology could provide potential benefits to a design team's attempt to understand the operational environment and its influences on warfare.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adelman, Jonathan R. *Symbolic War: The Chinese use of forces, 1840-1980*. Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1993.
- Alexander, Bevin. *Korea: The First War We Lost*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986.
- Army, U.S. *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*. Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006.
- Asakawa, Kan'chi. *The Russo-Japanese Conflict, Its Causes and Issues*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 1905.
- Babits, Lawrence E. *A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
- Board, Defense Science. *Understanding Human Dynamics*. Washinton: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2009.
- Bracken, Paul. *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and The Second Nuclear Age*. New York: Harper Collins, 1999.
- Bradley, Mark Phillip. *Imagining Vietnam and America: the Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000.
- Brightman, Robert. "Forget Culture: Replacement, Transcendence, Reflexification." *Cultural Anthropology* 10, 1995: 509-546.
- Chambers, John W. *To Raise An Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America*. New York: Free Press, 1987.
- Chen, King C. *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987.
- Cheng, Pao-min. *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute*. New York: Praeger, 1986.
- Citino, Robert. "Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction." *American Historical Review*, 2007: 1075-1088.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Clemente, Dave. "Book Reviews." *International Affairs* 87/6, 2011: 1507-1568.
- Corn, Tony. *Policy Review*. September 2006. <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/by-author/10422> (accessed December 12, 2011).
- Defense, Department of. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011.
- Elleman, Bruce. *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989*. New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Farrell, Theo. "World Culture and Military Power." *Security Studies*, 2005: 448-488.
- Ferris, John Robert. *Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Fitzgerald, Charles Patrick. *The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People*. New York: Praeger, 1972.
- Griffith, Samuel. *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

- Handel, Michael. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Hanson, Victor Davis. *Carnage and Culture*. New York: Anchor Books, 2001.
- Hart, Liddell. *Strategy*. New York: Meridian, 1991.
- Hastings, Max. *The Korean War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.
- Heuser, Beatrice. "The Cultural Revolution in Counterinsurgency." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, 2001: 155-169.
- . *The Evolution of Strategy: thinking war from Antiquity to the Present*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Hofstede, Geert. *Communication Between Cultures*. Edited by L.A. Samovar and R.E. Porter. Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984.
- Johnson, Janet Buttolph, and Richard A. Joslyn. *Political Science Research Methods*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1991.
- Johnson, Robert. "Book Review." *Journal of Military History* 74/1, 2010: 212-214.
- Kaplan, Robert D. "A History for Our Time." *Atlantic Monthly* 299, 2007: 78-84.
- Kaplan, Robert. "The South China Sea is the Future of Conflict." *Foreign Policy*, 2011: 79-90.
- Keegan, John. *A History of Warfare*. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
- Kellstedt, Paul, and Guy D. Whitten. *Political Science Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Kenny, Henry J. *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949*. Edited by Mark Ryan, David M. Finkelstein and Michael A. McDevitt. New York: CNA Corporation, 2003.
- King, Garing, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Krentz, Peter. *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*. Edited by Hans van Wees. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2009.
- Kuropatkin, Alexi. *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*. Edited by E. Swinton. Translated by A. Lindsay. Vol. 1. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1909.
- Lantis, Jeffrey S. *Center on Contemporary Conflict*. October 2005.  
<http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Oct/lantisOct05.html> (accessed December 2011).
- Lenin, V.I. *The Collapse of the Second International, Collected Works*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964.
- Li, Xiaobing, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu. *Mao's Generals Remember Korea*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
- Lynn, John. *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*. Boulder: Westview Press, 2003.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *The Prince*. New York: Penguin Books, 1975.
- Manheim, Jarole, Lars Willnat, and Craig Brians. *Empirical Political Analysis: Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods*. New York: Pearson Education Inc, 2008.
- Menning, Bruce W. *Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army 1861-1914*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

- Mockaitis, Thomas R. "The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapating to the Present, and Planning for the Future." *Strategic Studies Institute*, 2007: 34-49.
- Montagu, John Drogo. *Greek and Roman Warfare: Battles Tactics, and Trickery*. St. Paul: MBI Publishing, 2006.
- Osgood, Kenneth. *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006.
- Pangelinan, James G. *From Red Cliffs to Chosin: The Chinese Way of War*. Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010.
- Porter, Patrick. *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes*. New York: Columbia University, 2009.
- Porter, Robert. *Japan: The Rise of a Modern Power*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919.
- Presseisen, Enrst. *Before Aggression, Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army*. Tuscon: University of Arizona, 1965.
- Reinhart, W.H. *Taking Culture to the Next Level: Understanding and Using Culture at the Operational Level of War*. Newport: Naval War College, 2010.
- Sawyer, Ralph D. *Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*. Boulder : Westview Press, 1993.
- Sewell, William H. *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*. Edited by Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Shy, John. "The American Military Experience: History and Learning." *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 1, 1971: 205-228.
- Simmons, Robert. *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War*. New York: Free Press, 1975.
- Sisemore, James. *The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons not Learned*. Fort Leavenworth : School for Advanced Military Studies, 2003.
- Starkey, Armstrong. *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998.
- Swope, Kenneth. "Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi's Second Invasion of Korea, 1597-1598." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 6, 2006: 192-238.
- System, Selective Service. *Induction Statistics. In Induction (by year) from World War I Through the End of the Draft (1973)*. <http://www.sss.gov/induct.htm> (accessed January 2012).
- Thuy, Nguyen Hu'u. *The Chinese Aggression: Why and How it Failed* . Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979.
- Tylor, Edward. *Primitive Culture*. New York: J.P. Putnam and Sons, 1920.
- Tzu, Sun. *The Art of Warfare*. Translated by. Roger T. Ames. New York: Ballentine Books, 1993.
- Tzu, Sun. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Wannamaker, Claudine, trans. *The Russo-Japanese War: Russian Official Account, part 1*. Fort Leavenworth: USACGSOC, 1937.
- Ware, J. *Discussion of the Influence of the Trans-Siberian Railroad on the Plans and Operations of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905*. Fort Leveanworth: USACGSOC, 1931.

Zedong, Mao. *On Protracted War, Selected Military Writings*. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1963.

Zhang, Shu Guang. *Warfighting, the PLA experience since 1949*. Edited by Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein and Michael A. McDevitt. London: CNA Corporation, 2003.